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THE GROWTH OF AMERICAN JUDICIAL
HOSTILITY TOWARDS THE LIABILITY
LIMITATIONS OF THE WARSAW CONVENTION
RAY B. JEFFREY
t has been fifty years since the United States became a
party to the Warsaw Convention (Convention),' a treaty
which regulates international air commerce and limits airline
liability for deaths and personal injuries arising out of inter-
national air travel. During this time, American courts have
been faced with two conflicting duties. First, in cases involving
air travelers whose passenger tickets include a stopping place
outside the United States, the courts have been compelled by
the treaty to limit recoveries for wrongful death and personal
injury, regardless of the severity of the plaintiff's injuries.2
Second, the courts have strived in other kinds of civil suits,
including purely domestic air accident cases, to ensure full
compensation for the established loss or injury incurred by
Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International Trans-
portation by Air, Oct. 12, 1929, 49 Stat. 3000, T.S. No. 876, 137 L.N.T.S 11 (1934)
reprinted in 49 U.S.C. § 1502 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Warsaw Convention]. The
United States adhered to the Convention in 1934. See infra note 25.
' See, e.g., Ross v. Pan Am. Airways, 299 N.Y. 88, 85 N.E.2d 880 (1949) (limiting
the recovery of well-known theatrical performer Jane Froman to $8,300, in spite of
debilitating injuries which destroyed her lucrative career). The limitation on recov-
eries from international air accidents is found at Warsaw Convention, supra note 1,
art. 22.
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the plaintiff.'
As a result of the steady development of American empha-
sis on full compensation for losses sustained, the dollar
amount of recoveries in personal injury and wrongful death
actions has been rising.4 Consequently, the courts have chafed
under the restriction imposed by the Convention upon their
ability to fully compensate the victims of international air ac-
cidents.5 There has been widespread criticism in the United
States of the Warsaw Convention's liability limitations,' and
the courts, although bound by the treaty, have avoided en-
forcing its limitations whenever possible.'
This comment will trace the development of the judicial
hostility that has arisen over the last several decades in re-
sponse to perceived inequities' in the Warsaw Convention's li-
ability limitations. The analysis begins with a historical com-
' See Kreindler, A Plaintiff's View of Montreal, 33 J. AIR L. & CoM. 528 (1967).
The author states:
[T]here is no country in the world to my knowledge.... where injured
people or families of those who have been killed can get the kind of
compensation, the degree of adequate compensation, the degree of tai-
lor-made compensation scaled to the kind of loss sustained, as we do
today in the United States.
Id. at 530.
' See Loggans, Personal Injury Damages in International Aviation Litigation:
The Plaintiff's Perspective, 13 J. MAR. L. REv. 541 (1980).
5 See generally Comment, Limitations on Air Carrier Liability: An Inadvertent
Return to Common Law Principles, 48 J. AIR L. & CoM. 111, 141-43 (1982).
4 See, e.g., Haskell, The Warsaw System and the U.S Constitution Revisited, 39 J.
Am L. & CoM. 483 (1973); Kennelly, Response to Comments on Burdell v. Canadian
Pacific Airlines, 58 ILL. B. J. 454 (1970); Kreindler, supra note 3; Loggans, supra
note 4; Rhyne, International Law and Air Transportation, 47 MICH. L. REV. 41
(1948); Comment, Aviation Law: Attempts to Circumvent the Limitations of Liabil-
ity Imposed on Injured Passengers by the Warsaw Convention, 54 CHI-KEN r. L.
REV. 851 (1978); Comment, From Warsaw to Tenrife: Chronological Analysis of the
Liability Limitation Imposed Pursuant to the Warsaw Convention, 45 J. AIR L. &
Com. 653 (1980).
See, e.g., In re Aircrash in Bali, Indonesia on April 22, 1974, 684 F.2d 1301 (9th
Cir. 1982); Lisi v. Alitalia-Linee Aeree Italiane, S.P.A., 370 F.2d 508 (2d Cir. 1966); In
re Aircrash at Kimpo International Airport, Korea on November 18, 1981, 558 F.
Supp. 72 (C.D.Cal. 1983).
0 Some commentators have opposed the view that the Convention is inequitable.
See, e.g., Hildred, Air Carriers, Liability: Significance of the Warsaw Convention
and Events Leading Up to the Montreal Agreement, 33 J. AIR L. & CoM. 521 (1967);
Whitehead, Still Another View of the Warsaw Convention, 33 J. AIR. L. & Com. 651
(1967).
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mentary on the Convention and its subsequent modifications.
Next, judicial hostility to the Treaty is examined in the areas
of constitutionality, ticketing requirements, and rejection of
the Convention's use of gold francs to convert judgments into
domestic currency. In conclusion, there is an evaluation of the
effect of recent judicial decisions on the future vitality of the
Warsaw Convention's liability limitations.
I. THE TREATY
In both Paris in 1925 and Warsaw in 1929, international
conferences were convened to plan for the problems which
would necessarily arise as the civil aviation industry emerged
from its infancy.' The conference participants sought to
achieve two basic goals.10 First, they desired uniformity in
documentation and rules governing the rights and liabilities of
parties to contracts of international air carriage. 1 Such uni-
formity was deemed necessary because air commerce would
connect many countries with different languages, legal sys-
tems, and commercial pratices. 1" Second, the planners desired
to protect the fledgling airlines from potentially devastating
tort liability by placing limits on liability in exchange for a
limit on the air carriers' defenses." The 1929 conference
culminated in "The Convention for the Unification of Certain
Rules Relating to International Transportation by Air,""
known as the "Warsaw Convention" (Convention).
The most important and controversial provision of the con-
vention is article 22 which limits an airline's liability for pas-
senger injury or death to approximately $8,300.15 In exchange
I Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, The United States and the Warsaw Convention, 80
HARV. L. REV. 497, 498 (1967). See, C. GIBBS-SMITH, THE AEROPLANE: AN HISTORICAL
SURVEY, 97-100 (1960) for an account of the underdeveloped state of air transporta-
tion in the first quarter of the twentieth century. See also, Wright, The Warsaw Con-
vention's Damage Limitation, 6 CLEV.-MAR. L. REV. 290 (1957).




" See supra note 1.
" Article 22 of the Warsaw Convention limits liability to 125,000 "Poincare
francs," a unit of account "consisting of 65 1/52 milligrams of gold at the standard of
1983]
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for this limit on passengers' recoverable damages, the Conven-
tion created a rebuttable presumption that any accident re-
sulted from the carrier's negligence.' To rebut the presump-
tion, the carrier must prove that all necessary measures were
taken to avoid the accident, or that it was impossible to take
such measures.' 7 The liability limitation may not be invoked,
however, if the airline is found guilty of willful misconduct."8
The Convention is applicable to "all international transpor-
tation . . . performed by aircraft for hire."' 9 International
transportation" is defined as:
any transportation in which ... the place of departure and the
place of destination ... are situated either within the territo-
ries of two High Contracting Parties [countries adhering to the
fineness of nine hundred thousandths." Warsaw Convention, supra note 1, art. 22.
The dollar equivalent of this limitation has been set at roughly $8,300 since the
United States devaluation in 1933. See Clare, Evaluation of Proposals to Increase
the "Warsaw Convention" Limit of Passenger Liability, 16 J. AIR L. & CoM. 53, 54,
57 (1949). The Convention also contains limits on recovery for loss of baggage or
cargo. See infra note 187. In 1982, a United States federal court of appeals held the
Warsaw Convention's liability limitation on baggage loss prospectively uneforceable,
because gold no longer has an official monetary function and Congress has not speci-
fied a unit of conversion to be used by American courts in translating judgments
under the Convention into U. S. dollars. Franklin Mint Corp. v. Trans World Air-
lines, 690 F.2d 303 (2d Cir. 1982).
" Article 17 of the Warsaw Convention states:
The carrier shall be liable for damages sustained in the event of the
death or wounding of a passenger or any other bodily injury suffered
by a passenger, if the accident which caused the damage so sustained
took place on board the aircraft or in the course of any of the opera-
tions or embarking or disembarking.
Warsaw Convention, supra note 1, art. 17. Article 17, which allows injured passengers
to rely on a presumption of fault against the airlines, was seen as a reasonable quid
pro quo for limiting damages to a maximum of $8,300. Subsequent to the Convention,
however, the increasing application by American courts of the doctrine of res ipsa
loquitor to airplane crashes has substantially reduced the importance of this pre-
sumption of negligence to passengers suing in the United States. Res ipsa loquitur
creates an inference of negligence, but does not shift the burden of proof, as does a
presumption of negligence. See Rhyne, International Law and Air Transportation,
47 MiCH. L. REV. 41, 57 (1948).
7 Article 20 of the Warsaw Convention provides that: "The carrier shall not be
liable if he proves that he and his agents have taken all necessary measures to avoid
the damage or that it was impossible ... to take such measures ...." Warsaw Con-
vention, supra note 1, art. 20.
I Id. art. 25.
19 Id. art. 1(1).
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Convention], or within the territory of a single High Con-
tracting Party, if there is an agreed stopping place within a ter-
ritory. . . of another power, even though that power is not a
party to this convention." '2 0
In addition, actions brought under the Warsaw Convention
are subject to limitations. They must meet a two-year period
of limitation,"1 and must be brought where the carrier is dom-
iciled or has its principal place of business, where the carrier
has a place of business through which the contract of carriage
was made, or at the place of destination.2 Any questions of
whether or not the Warsaw Convention applies in a particular
case are determined by the ticket issued to the passenger."
The Convention went into effect in 193324 and the United
States became a signatory of the Convention in 1934.25 The
treaty is now in force in over ninety countries, 2 and applies to
virtually all international air transportation. Where applica-
Id. art. 1(2). For a general discussion of issues and controversies related to deter-
mination of whether a flight is "international transportation" within the meaning of
the Warsaw Convention, see S. SPEISER & C. KRAuse, supra note 10, § 11.8.
" Warsaw Convention, supra note 1, art. 29.
I Id. art. 28(1).
u Id. art. 1(2). Applicability of the Warsaw Convention is unaffected by such con-
siderations as the passenger's residence or nationality, which airline performs the car-
riage, or on which leg of the journey the accident takes place. See Lowenfeld & Men-
delsohn, supra note 9, at 500-01. Thus, for example, a citizen of Dallas on a
commuter flight between Dallas and Houston is subject to the terms of the Conven-
tion if his ticket includes an earlier or later stop outside the United States. It is likely
that most such passengers would be suprised to learn that such a flight constitutes
"international transportation."
"' Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra note 9, at 501-02. Under the terms of Article 37
of the Warsaw Convention, the treaty became effective ninety days after its ratifica-
tion by five of the contracting parties of the Warsaw Conference. Warsaw Conven-
tion, supra note 1, art. 37.
Is Haskell, The Warsaw System and the U.S. Constitution Revisited, 39 J. AIR L.
& COM. 483, 485 (1973). The commentator states:
[Ulpon the recommendation of the Commerce Department and the
State Department, President Roosevelt submitted the Treaty to the
United States Senate. On June 15, 1934, the Senate gave its advice
and consent. The United States then deposited its instrument of ad-
herence on July 31, 1934, and President Roosevelt proclaimed adher-
ence to the Treaty in October 1934.
Id.
" The nations of the world which adhere to the Warsaw Convention are listed in 1
L. KREINDLER, AVIATION AcCIDENT LAw § 11.01[3] (1971).
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ble, the Convention supersedes domestic American law be-
cause it is a treaty of the United States and as such is the
supreme law of the land.27
Not long after the United States became a party to the
treaty, debates began concerning whether the Convention
should be revised 28 The debates focused on the provisions in
the treaty for limiting liability. The fundamental and recur-
ring issue at the various conferences was whether the limits
had been set at the appropriate level.2  Opponents of the Con-
vention limitations argued that generally in developed coun-
tries such as the United States, recoveries in personal injury
and death actions far exceeded the amounts allowed by the
Warsaw Convention."0 Also, air safety had greatly improved,
reducing the cost of liability insurance to air carriers.3 1 In fact,
because air transportation had outgrown its financially inse-
cure beginnings, there was speculation as to whether the air-
lines still merited special protection from full tort liability.2
After years of discussions and meetings, a diplomatic con-
ference convened at the Hague in 1955 to amend the Warsaw
Convention." The goal of the American representatives at the
Hague Conference was to ensure maximum recoveries for the
victims of air crashes. The delegates at the Hague adopted
27 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. The Ninth Circuit has noted that:"Treaties, under the
Constitution are the supreme law of the land .... As such, treaty provisions which
create domestic law have the same effect as legislation, and supersede previous con-
flicting legislation." In re Aircrash in Bali, Indonesia on April 22, 1974, 684 F.2d 1301,
1309 (9th Cir. 1982) (reviewing the constitutionality of the Warsaw Convention and
holding that the limitations on recovery might constitute a Fifth Amendment
"taking").
28 See Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra note 9, at 502. As early as 1935, the
Comite-International Technique d'Experts Juridique Aeriens (CITEJA) began dis-
cussing possible changes to the Warsaw Convention. Conferences on the proposed
revisions were held in Cairo in 1946, Madrid in 1951, Paris in 1952, and Rio de
Janeiro in 1953. Id. at 502-03.




Id. at 504-05. For a discussion of the Hague Protocol and the events leading up
to it, see Beaumont, The Warsaw Convention of 1929, as Amended by the Protocol
Signed at the Hague, on September 28, 1955, 22 J. AIR L. & CoM. 414 (1955).
3, Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra note 9, at 507. United States attendance at the
Hague marked the first American participation in the Convention's drafting process.
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an amendment to the Warsaw Convention, known as the
Hague Protocol, " which significantly changed two provisions
of the Warsaw Convention. 6 The Warsaw Convention's am-
biguous term "willful misconduct 3 7 was deleted and replaced
by a provision which held that the carrier would be subject to
unlimited liability if the plaintiff could prove "that the dam-
age resulted from an act or omission of the carrier . . done
with intent to cause damage or recklessly and with knowledge
that damage would probably result."' 8 More importantly, 39
the Hague Protocol doubled the Warsaw Convention's liabil-
ity limit to approximately $16,600.40
Although the United States delegates to the Hague Confer-
ence strongly supported many of the Warsaw Convention
modifications, the response from the American legal commu-
nity was unfavorable.4' Opposition to the Hague Protocol in
the United States was not focused on the adequacy of the pre-
cise limitations contained in the Protocol, but instead at-
tacked the concept of limitations on liability in general.42 Ar-
guments were made that, given the profitability and
impressive safety records of the commercial air industry, there
The United States did not send an official delegation to either the Paris Conference
of 1925 or the Warsaw Conference of 1929. Haskell, supra note 25, at 485.
35 Protocol to Amend the Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating
to International Carriage by Air, signed at Warsaw on October 12, 1929, 478 U.N.T.S.
371 (1955) [hereinafter cited as the Hague Protocol].
36 The provision for recovery of legal fees proved to be unimportant because it was
not mandatory and had no effect on courts which did not already award attorneys
fees. See Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra note 9, at 509-10.
37 See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
8 Hague Protocol, supra note 35, art. XIII. It is not clear whether the phrase in-
troduced by the Hague Protocol embodied a subjective or objective standard, thus
uncertainties remain concerning application of the exception. Lowenfeld & Mendel-
sohn, supra note 9, at 525.
" See Calkins, Grand Canyon, Warsaw and the Hague Protocol, 23 J. AIR L. &
CoM. 253 (1956) (stating "[b]y far the most important issue considered by the Confer-
ence, and the one on which most debate was had, was the matter of limitation of
liability for passenger death or personal liability").
40 Hague Protocol, supra note 35, art. XI. The United States failed in its attempt
to have the liability limit raised to $25,000 due to stiff resistance from less developed
countries. See Loggans, supra note 4, at 545.
" Sce Loggans, supra note 4, at 545-46 (stating "[tihe doubling of the Warsaw
limit by the Hague Protocol failed to mollify an increasingly angry bar and bench").
4" See Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra note 9, at 510.
1983]
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was no longer a need to provide it with special protection.
Proponents of the Hague Protocol failed to muster enough
support in the Senate to achieve ratification."
Opposition to the Warsaw and Hague liability limitations
persisted in the ten years following the Hague Conference. 4"
Finally, in 1965, the United States formally denounced the
Warsaw Convention.4" The denunciation was to become effec-
tive six months after the announcement. 4 The State Depart-
ment press release explained that the action resulted from
dissatisfaction with the Convention's excessively low liability
limits on personal injury and death claims of passengers.48
The announcement stated, however, that the denunciation
would be withdrawn if all international air carriers would
agree to an interim arrangement whereby they would waive
the Warsaw Convention liability limitations up to $75,000 per
passenger.'
The threat of denunciation by the United States was of ma-
jor importance to the continued survival of the Warsaw Con-
vention because a majority of all international aviation carri-
ers and passengers were American." Thus, a special meeting
of the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO)51 was
convened in Montreal in early 1966 to avert American with-
drawal from the treaty.5 Negotiations at this special meeting
" For arguments pro and con regarding the Hague Protocol, see Hearings on the
the Hague Protocol to the Warsaw Convention Before the Senate Committee on For-
eign Relations, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965).
" Haskell, supra note 25, at, 486.
" Id. at 486-87.
46 Id.
17 Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra note 9, at 550-52, citing 50 DEP'T ST. BULL. 923
(1965). Article 39 of the Warsaw Convention states that any member country may
denounce the Convention upon six months notice. Warsaw Convention, supra note 1,
art. 39.
" Dep't St. Bull., supra note 47, 923.
,9 Id. For a full explanation of the denunciation and the reasons for it, primarily
the low limitation on liability, see Montreal Agreement, infra note 53.
:0 Haskell, supra note 25, at 487.
' The origin and functions of the ICAO are discussed in S. SPEisER & C. KRAusE,
supra note 10, § 11.3.
82 Loggans, supra note 4, at 546. For a comprehensive discussion of events leading
to the Montreal Conference, as well as the negotiations which occurred there, see
Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra note 9.
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resulted in the Montreal Agreement," which was signed by
the major airlines of the world. 4
The Montreal Agreement contained three principal terms.5
First, the air carriers 'agreed to waive the liability limitation of
Article 22 of the Warsaw Convention" up to $75,000, includ-
ing legal fees and costs.6 7 Second, the carriers were required to
provide tickets notifying passengers of the liability limitations
imposed by the Warsaw Convention, the Hague Protocol, and
the Montreal Agreement.58 Third, the airlines gave up their
defenses under Article 20 of the Convention,5 e leaving them
with virtual strict liability for air crashes.S° Pursuant to the
signing of the Montreal Agreement, the United States with-
drew its denunciation of the Warsaw Convention."'
83 CIVIL AERONAUTICS BOARD, AGREEMENT 18900, AGREEMENT RELATING TO LIABILITY
LIMITATIONS OF THE WARSAW CONVENTION AND THE HAGUE PROTOCOL (1966), approved
by CIVIL AERONAUTICS BOARD, ORDER No. E-23680 (May 13, 1966) reprinted in 31
Fed. Reg. 7302 (1966) [hereinafter cited as Montreal Agreement].
', Member nations of the Convention did not sign the Montreal Agreement be-
cause it is not a protocol or formal amendment to the Convention. The Montreal
Agreement is a "special contract" under Article 22(1) of the Warsaw Convention,
which states: "Nevertheless, by special contract the carrier and the passenger may
agree to higher limit of liability." Warsaw Convention, supra note 1, art. 22(1). A
passenger is contractually bound by accepting a ticket containing reasonable notice
therein of the terms of the Montreal Agreement. See Comment, From Warsaw to
Tenerife: Chronological Analysis of the Liability Limitations Imposed Pursuant to
the Warsaw Convention, 45 J. AIR L. & CoM. 653, 669 (1980). Note, however, that
passengers were not actually represented at the Montreal Conference:
The meeting of the Panel of Experts according to the report was a
closed meeting. It is true that there were representatives of the airlines
(IATA) there. And representatives of the insurers were there through
the IUAI. So, it was "closed" only in the sense that passengers were
not there, or passenger's representatives were not there.
Kreindler, supra note 3, at 529.
*' See Comment, supra note 54, at 669.
" See supra note 15.
57 Montreal Agreement, supra note 53, § 1(1).
SId. § 2.
89 See supra note 17.
"o Montreal Agreement, supra note 53, § 1(2). The only defense left to the airlines
under the Montreal Agreement is contributory negligence of the passenger under Ar-
ticle 21 of the Warsaw Convention, which states: "If the carrier proves that the dam-
age was caused by or contributed to by the negligence of the injured person the court
may, in accordance with provisions of its own law, exonerate the carrier wholly or
partly from his liability." Warsaw Convention, supra note 1, art. 21.
'I Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra note 9, at 596, citing PRESS RELEASES Nos. 110
& 111 (MAY 13 & 14, 1966), 54 DEP'T ST. BULL. 955-57 (1966).
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Although the Montreal Agreement is in full force today, it
was intended merely as an interim measure which would be
superseded by a formal amendment to the Warsaw Conven-
tion.62 Consequently, the member nations met in Guatemala
City in 1971 to once again increase the liability limitation."
The Guatemala Protocol,"" produced at the Guatemala City
Conference, limits liability, without any exceptions, to
$100,000 and imposes strict liability on the airlines.' Article
20 of the Guatemala Protocol provides, in effect, that the Pro-
tocol will not become effective unless ratified by the United
States.6  That ratification has not been forthcoming.6 7
In 1975, the ICAO met in Montreal and drafted an amend-
ment to the Convention known as Montreal Protocol No. 3.
The new agreement, which is essentially the same as the Gua-
temala Protocol, provides for strict liability,6' encouragement
of settlements,70 an inflexible liability limit of approximately
$117,000,7' and an optional Supplemental Compensation Plan
e 53 Dep't State Bull., supra note 47 at 923 (1965).
See Comment, Aviation Law: Attempts to Circumvent the Limitations of Lia-
bility Imposed on Injured Passengers by the Warsaw Convention, 54 CHi-KENT L.
REv. 851, 853 (1978).
" Protocol to Amend the Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating
to International Carriage by Air, ICAO Doc. No. 8932 (1971) [hereinafter cited as the
Guatemala Protocol].
66 Guatemala Protocol, supra note 64, art. VIII.
" See S. SPEISER & C. KRAUSE, supra note 10, at § 11:20. The authors state that
"[a]rticle 20 of the Protocol requires that it be ratified by thirty nations, and that
those nations comprise 'forty per cent of the total international scheduled air traffic
of the airlines of the member states of the International Civil Aviation Organization
in 1970.'" Id. at n.35. The American percentage of international air traffic makes
compliance with Article 20 impossible without United States ratification. See Com-
ment, supra note 54, at 675.
67 See Comment, supra note 54, at 677.
66 Montreal Protocol No. 3 is reprinted in A. LOWENFELD, AVIATION LAW 985 (Docu-
ments Supp. 2d ed. 1981) [hereinafter cited as Montreal Protocol No. 3]; Records of
the Conference proceedings and all relevant documents can be found in ICAO Inter-
national Conference on Air Law, ICAO Doc. No. 9154-LC/174-1, 174-2 (1975).
6 Montreal Protocol No. 3, supra note 68, art. II § 1(a).
o Id. § 3(b).
" Id. § 1(a). The Montreal Protocol sets the limit in terms of 100,000 Special
Drawing Rights (SDR's) rather than in Poincare francs, as did the Warsaw Conven-
tion and the other protocols. This change was due to the stability of SDR's and the
fluctuating role of gold in the international monetary system. For a full explanation
of the SDR system, see Effros, Maintenance of Value in the General Account and
Valuation of the SDR in the Special Drawing Account of the IMF 6 GA. J. INT'L &
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(SCP).7 z Passage of Montreal Protocol No. 3 was defeated in
1983, when it failed to garner the support of two-thirds of the
Senate.73 In view of the fact that the Senate has not ratified a
single protocol to the 1929 Warsaw Convention, perhaps
plaintiffs attorney Lee Kreindler was correct when he stated
in 1967 that:
[N]o convention with a limitation of damages can possibly pass
the Senate of the United States .... [Wihen anyone or any-
thing, be it an international organization or an outdated treaty,
attempts to impose an arbitrary or artificial limitation of any
kind on this concept [of just compensation], there is going to
be a clash of ideology. And I do not think in this day and age
you will see any further ratification of limitations.7 4
II. CONSTITUTIONAL REVIEW OF THE WARSAW CONVENTION
It is a well-established principle of American law that trea-
ties must conform to the guidelines set by the Constitution,
and the courts are empowered to strike down a treaty which
violates constitutional provisions.7 6 The United States Su-
preme Court, however, has shown tremendous deference to
the executive and legislative branches of the federal govern-
ment with regard to the treaty-making power.7e Never in its
history has the Supreme Court declared a treaty to be uncon-
CoMP. L. 493, 504 (1976).
72 See Comment, supra note 54, at 678-81. Montreal Protocol No. 3 provides for
the right of each party to the treaty to establish its own SCP. Ratification of Mon-
treal Protocol No. 3 is contingent, however, on United States approval of an SCP for
its own citizens. Id. at 678. The SCP, which was considered by the Senate in 1983,
would require each passenger to pay a surcharge of $2.00 per ticket for an additional
$200,000 of liability insurance. Hollings, The Montreal Protocols: A Threat to the
American System of Jurispurdence, TRIAL Sept. 1982, at 69.
73 129 CONG. REC. S2279 (daily ed. March 8, 1983).
74 Kreindler, supra note 54, at 529, 531.
" In re Aircrash in Bali, Indonesia, 684 F.2d 1301, 1309 (9th Cir. 1982); Pierre v.
Eastern Airlines, 152 F. Supp. 486, 488 (D.N.J. 1957). See also L. HENKIN, FOREIGN
AFFAIRS AND THE CONSTITUTION 205-24 (1972); see generally W. COWLES, TREATIES
AND CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PROPERTY INTERFERENCES AND DUE PROCESS OF LAW (1941).
76 Haskell, supra note 25, at 494. The power to make treaties is granted to the
President in Article II of the United States Constitution. This power is conditioned,
however, on the advice and consent (by a majority of two thirds) of the Senate. U.S.
CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
19831
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stitutional. 7 This judicial reluctance to declare treaties un-
constitutional has been reflected in half a century of cases
dealing with the Warsaw Convention.78 In the face of an in-
creasing number of constitutional challenges to the Conven-
tion in recent years, lower American courts have likewise been
largely unresponsive. 70 Numerous courts have managed to
sidestep any direct decision on the Warsaw Convention's con-
stitutionality, and thus no clear consensus has emerged con-
cerning the Convention's constitutionality.8"
At the outset, a review of cases on the Convention reveals
that the United States Supreme Court, which is the court of
last resort on any treaty question, has never decided a case
dealing with the constitutionality or any other aspect of the
Convention.8" As the following cases will illustrate, the small
number of lower court decisions which have examined the
Convention's constitutional status have done so with varying
degrees of thoroughness. In 1944, in a case arising out of an
international air crash, a New York trial court rejected a con-
stitutional attack on the Warsaw Convention without analyz-
ing, or even revealing the nature of the plaintiff's argument.82
7 Haskell, supra note 25, at 493.
78 See infra notes 83, 86, 94, 111, 115, 121 and accompanying text.
" See Loggans, supra note 4, at 560.
80 S. SPEISER & C. KRAUSE, supra note 10, § 11:5. See also Molitch v. Irish Interna-
tional Airlines, 436 F.2d 42 (2d Cir. 1970) (plaintiff did not properly raise constitu-
tional question at trial, therefore the court of appeals refused to address the issue); In
re Pago Pago Aircrash, 419 F. Supp. 1158 (C.D. Cal. 1976) (on motions raising the
constitutional issue, court ruled that it would be improper to decide constitutionality
before a jury determination on the question of willful misconduct); Eck v. United
Arab Airlines, 15 N.Y.2d 53, 203 N.E. 2d 640, 255 N.Y.S.2d 249 (1964) (court found
for plaintiff on other grounds, without discussing constitutional issues). For addi-
tional examples of judicial evasion of the issue of the Warsaw Convention's constitu-
tionality, see S. SPEISER & C. KRAUSE, supra note 10, § 11:5, n.31.
at See S. SPEISER & C. KRAUSE, supra note 10, § 11.5. Although Supreme Court
review has been sought in many Warsaw Convention cases, certiorari has been denied
in all cases except one. In that case, Lisi v. Alitalia-Linee Aeree Italiane, 370 F.2d 508
(2d Cir. 1966), which raised no constitutional issues, the eight sitting Supreme Court
justices split four-to-four, and thus the lower court was affirmed without an opinion.
Alitalia-Linee Aeree Italinane v. Lisi, 390 U.S. 455 (1968).
" Garcia v. Pan American Airways, 183 Misc. 258, 50 N.Y.S.2d 250 (1944), aff'd
per curiam, 295 N.Y. 852, 67 N.E.2d 257 (1946) (on appeal, affirmance was made
without any comment on the merits).
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The court in Garcia v. Pan American Airways8" ruled that
unless a law is clearly and unquestionably unconstitutional, it
must be accepted as constitutional until an appellate court
holds otherwise.8s According to the court, this reasoning is
even more compelling in the case of a law such as the Warsaw
Convention, which has "great importance and far-reaching
effect." '
Indemnity Insurance Co. of North America v. Pan Ameri-
can Airways,8 decided in the same year as Garcia and involv-
ing an aircrash covered by the Warsaw Convention, contains a
slightly more developed constitutional analysis. The plaintiff
in Indemnity Insurance contended that the Warsaw Conven-
tion usurped the exclusive power of Congress to regulate com-
merce,8 7 and that application of the Warsaw Convention
would deprive the plaintiff of its claim to full compensation
without due process of law.88 The court responded to the first
contention by observing that the Warsaw Convention had
been duly ratified under the terms of the Constitution. 9 Fur-
thermore, no treaty had ever been challenged on the ground
of a conflict with the Congressional commerce power.9 0 "While
the novelty of an argument is not to be taken against it," the
court noted, the "uninterrupted uniformity of the practice by
which treaties of commerce ... have been made" merits defer-
ence to their validity."1 According to the court, the longstand-
ing acceptance of duly ratified commerce treaties as well as
the broad nature of the treaty-making power were sufficient
83 Id.
" Id. at 259, 50 N.Y.S.2d at 251. The court failed to mention which constitutional
grounds were being asserted by plaintiff. Id.
88 Id.
86 58 F. Supp. 338 (S.D.N.Y. 1944).
87 Id. at 339. The commerce power is granted in Article I of the United States
Constitution: "The Congress shall have Power . . .to regulate Commerce with For-
eign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes." U.S. CONST.
art. I, sec. 8, cl. 1, 3.
8 58 F. Supp. at 339. The fifth amendment states that "[n]o person shall ... be
deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." U.S. CONST. amend.V.
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reasons to uphold the Convention. 2 The Indemnity Insur-
ance court summarily dismissed the plaintiff's more predict-
able due process argument merely by stating that "[s]tatutes
for the limitation of liability are no novelty.""3
In Pierre v. Eastern Air Lines94 the plaintiff, in his motion
to strike the defendant's assertion of the Convention's liabil-
ity limitation, made the argument that the Convention de-
prived the plaintiff of his constitutional right to a jury trial by
limiting the jury's determination of damages.9 5 The court ex-
amined whether the jury's exclusive right to determine the
fact of liability necessarily includes the right to assess dam-
ages."' Analogizing to the Longshoremen and Harbor Workers
Compensation Act,97 and to various unspecified state Work-
men's Compensation Acts, the court found that assessing
damages is not an exclusive function of the jury, but is instead
"a matter of practice rather than of right."9 " In dictum, the
court also placed great importance on the fact that the Con-
vention provided a"reasonable quid pro quo" for its liability
limitation by establishing a presumption of negligence against
airlines. 9
Although a presumption of the constitutional validity of
treaties has been widely accepted by American courts, as of
" Id. at 340.
*s Id. The court's reasoning was inadequately developed because the presence of
other such statutes establishes only that liability limitations are not per se invalid.
Curiously, the court did not consider whether or not significant differences exist be-
tween the Warsaw Convention and other statutes which limit liability. Although some
liability-limiting statutes are valid, only statues which do so in a rational manner are
constitutional. See generally Hay, Comments on Burdell u. Canadian Pacific Airlines
and the Constitutionality of the Warsaw Convention, 58 ILL. B.J. 26, 37 (1969).
" 152 F. Supp. 486 (D.N.J. 1957).
95 Id. at 487. The seventh amendment provides,"[i]n Suits at common law, where
the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be
preserved .... ." U.S. CONST. amend. VII.
152 F. Supp. at 488.
33 U.S.C. § 901 (1976).
9' 152 F. Supp. at 488. The court recognized, "[i]n civil actions within the comtem-
plation of the Constitution, the fact of liability for damages was unquestionably
within the sole province of the jury," but it distinguished between determination of
liability and assessment of damages. Id.
" Id. at 489. This point is not well taken because the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur
has virtually nullified the importance of the presumption of negligence. See supra
note 16.
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1968, only one court had demonstrated its willingness to
closely scrutinize the Warsaw Convention in the light of the
Constitution.100 In Burdell v. Canadian Pacific Airlines0 ' the
court held that the Convention unconstitutionally violated the
plaintiff's right to due process'"2 and equal protection'"s of the
laws.' 0 ' The court began its analysis with an extensive series
of quotations from legal authorities in support of judicial re-
view of treaties on constitutional grounds.' 05 Various facts and
statistics regarding the low cost of insurance to airlines, the
industry's impressive safety record, and the great financial re-
sources of modern air carriers were cited'00 in Burdell to sup-
port the finding that "the preferential treatment accorded air-
lines has no economic, moral or legal justification at the
present time.'10 7 Thus, the court held that the Convention vi-
olated the plaintiff's right to due process because it deprived
him of full compensation for damages, without a rational jus-
tification. 08 Similarly, the court found the Convention to be
in violation of the plaintiff's right to equal protection of the
laws, because it continued, without sufficient reason, to pro-
vide preferential treatment to airlines, even though such
treatment was unavailable to other aircrash defendants such
as manufacturers or the United States Government. 0 9
,00 Burdell v. Canadian Pacific Airlines, 10 Av. Cas. 18,151 (Il1. Cir. Ct. 1968). The
decision was later revised by the trial judge at 11 Av. Cas. 17,351 (I1. Cir. Ct. 1969).
101 Id.
,01 See supra note 88.
108 See Schneider v. Rusk, 377 U.S. 163, 168 (1964) (holding that the guarantee of
equal protection of the laws is impliedly, though not expressly, found in the fifth
amendment).
,04 10 Av. Cas. at 18,160. The Burdell court has been criticized for failing to keep
its due process and equal protection arguments separate. See Hay, supra note 93, at
37. This criticism is more formalistic than substantive, since the court's forceful lan-
guage clearly bases both arguments on the irrationality and arbitrariness of the War-
saw Convention as applied in 1968. 10 Av. Cas. at 18,160-61.
10 Av. Cas. at 18,156-57.
'" Id. at 18,158-60.
107 Id. at 18,160.
'" Id. at 18,160-61. The court recognized that there was adequate justification for
the Warsaw Convention's liability limitation when the commercial aviation industry
was in its infancy, but progress had eradicated any such justification by the 1960's.
Id. at 18,158-60.
109 Id. at 18,161. For helpful opposing discussions of Burdell compare Hay, supra
note 93, with Kennelly, Response to Comments on Burdell v. Canadian Pacific Air-
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Burdell marked the first time that an American court had
attempted to thoroughly analyze the Warsaw Convention's
constitutional status. The case has little precedential value,
however, because the court ruled that the Convention was in-
applicable to the facts before it. 10 Thus, its discussion of con-
stitutionality was merely dictum. In 1969, the Burdell court
published a revised opinion"' in which it omitted all constitu-
tional analysis as unnecessary in light of its decision that the
Convention did not apply to the case." 2 The court nonethe-
less reaffirmed its view that the Convention is
unconstitutional." 3
In 1974, the Convention survived a challenge in United
States federal court that it unconstitutionally deprived the
American plaintiffs, who had been passengers on a flight from
Kenya to London, of the right to litigate claims arising from
their flight." 4 In McCarthy v. East African Airways' 5 the
plaintiffs were precluded by the court under article 28(1) of
the Convention"" from maintaining suit in the United States
because that was not the place of the defendant's domicile,
principal place of business, or where it had sold the airline
ticket."1 In addition, the plaintiffs also failed to satisfy article
28(1) because their ticketed destination was not the United
States.'" The court dismissed the case for lack of treaty juris-
diction and stated that federal court jurisdiction extended
only as far as Congress permitted by law." 9 Thus, because
treaties have the same force and effect as domestic laws, the
lines, 58 ILL. B.J. 454 (1970).
110 10 Av. Cas. at 18,155. The decedent's flight originated in Singapore, which did
not adhere to the Convention until after the accident. Thus, the flight was not "inter-
national transportation" as defined by article 1(2) of the Warsaw Convention, supra
note 1. 10 Av. Cas. at 18,155.
11 Av. Cas. 17,351 (1969).
111 Id. at 17,354.
"1 Id.
114 McCarthy v. East African Airways Corp., 13 Av. Cas. 17,385 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
115 Id.
lIE See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
1,7 13 Av. Cas. at 17,386.




Warsaw Convention was held to constitutionally restrict fed-
eral subject matter jurisdiction.1 20
The most important case yet decided on the issue of the
Convention's constitutionality, In re Aircrash in Bali, Indone-
sia on April 22, 1974,121 involved multiple wrongful death ac-
tions arising out of an aircrash in Indonesia.'22 Three argu-
ments were advanced by the plaintiffs in Bali. " First, the
plaintiffs asserted that the Convention's limitation on liability
was so arbitrary and unreasonable as to deprive them of sub-
stantive due process. 2 4 Second, for the same reasons, it was
argued that the limitation deprived them of equal protection
of the laws. 2 Third, the plaintiffs contended that the limita-
tion impermissibly burdened their constitutional right to
travel. "
The Bali court began its analysis by asserting its judicial
power to review the constitutionality of the Warsaw Conven-
tion which it declared, "must withstand essentially the same
tests as would domestic legislation against a claim that it de-
nies rights guaranteed by the Constitution.' 1 7 After identify-
ing the plaintiffs' constitutional arguments, the court referred
to Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Environmental Study
Group,2 0 a 1978 United States Supreme Court case, which set
the standard of review for due process and equal protection
attacks on economic regulations under the commerce
clause.' 21 The standard of review established by the Supreme
120 Id.
12 684 F.2d 1301 (9th Cir. 1982).
122 Id. at 1304.
123 Id. at 1309.
124 Id.
125 Id.
126 Id. The right to travel was first implied from the United States Constitution in
Crandall v. Nevada, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 35 (1868) (holding that a tax on travelers un-
constitutionally violated the right to travel).
11" 684 F.2d at 1309.
121 438 U.S. 59 (1978). The plaintiff in Duke Power challenged the constitutionality
of the Price-Anderson Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2210 (1976), which limits liability for injury
resulting from nuclear power plant accidents. The Supreme Court held that the Act
did not violate plaintiffs' due process or equal protection rights because there was
sufficient need for the limitation of liability. Id. at 86-87.
" 684 F.2d at 1309. The commerce clause is quoted supra at note 87.
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Court for such cases would invalidate economic regulations
which are arbitrary or irrational. 30 In Bali, the Ninth Circuit
held that the Convention's limitation on liability is an eco-
nomic regulation subject to the prohibition against irrational-
ity and arbitrariness. 31
The Bali court next turned to the plaintiffs' right-to-travel
argument, noting that international travel, like interstate
travel, is a fundamental right protected by the Constitution. 2
An economic penalty, such as the Convention's liability limi-
tation, was declared by the court to be equivalent to a direct
restriction on the exercise of one's right to travel. 33 Accord-
ingly, the Convention would be invalid if it could be shown
that it was not "carefully tailored to serve a substantial and
legitimate government interest."'" 4
The basis for all three of the plaintiffs' arguments was the
contention that the Convention's liability limitation no longer
serves any legitimate or rational governmental purpose." 5 In
support of this claim, the Bali court reviewed information
which demonstrated the airline industry's safety and insura-
bility.'8 The court also indicated that the United States Gov-
ernment's failure to assert "any national interest in limiting
liability per se" was further evidence of the lack of any valid
governmental purpose. 1 7 The plaintiffs' argument that the
Warsaw Convention provides no procedural benefits to Ameri-
can plaintiffs in exchange for the liability limitation was
100 438 U.S. at 83.
18 684 F.2d at 1309.
1" Id.
's Id. at 1309-10. This argument is not very substantial, however, because it is
doubtful that any individual would be deterred from traveling by an economic "pen-
alty" which is imposed only retrospectively.
18 Id. at 1309. The court noted that there was a question as to whether the plain-
tiffs had standing to assert their decedents' constitutional right to travel. It con-
cluded, though, that this "may be one of the cases in which constitutional rights can




187 Id. The United States contended that acceptance of limitations on liability is a
necessary concession in achieving international agreement concerning regulation of
international air travel. Id.
COMMENTS
found by the court to be "persuasive. '"13
Although the Bali court appeared persuaded by what it
termed the plaintiffs' "substantial" constitutional argu-
ments,' 3 ' it declined to rule on the Convention's constitution-
ality because the question was not ripe for decision. "4 In the
court's view, the plaintiffs' contentions were expressed prema-
turely because a remedy was available which might provide
them with full compensation for any damages not recoverable
under the Convention."" According to the court, the plaintiffs
could argue under the Tucker Act" to the Court of Claims
that the Convention's limitation on their recoveries amounted
to a "taking"' 4' for which the United States must give just
compensation.' 4 4
The Ninth Circuit considered the Bali situation to be analo-
gous to that faced by the Supreme court in Dames & Moore v.
Regan.'" In Dames & Moore, the Court was faced with the
issue of whether the executive order which released Iranian
assets held by American creditors in order to secure the re-
lease of American hostages was a constitutional exercise of
presidential power.'" The court upheld the President's order,
but stated that if the release of assets amounted to a fifth
amendment taking of property, compensation would be avail-
able through the Court of Claims." 7
The Bali court followed Dames & Moore by holding that





14 28 U.S.C. § 1491 (1976). The Tucker Act provides: "[t]he Court of Claims shall
have jurisdiction to render judgment on any claim against the United States founded
either upon the constitution, or any Act of Congress or any regulation of an executive
department ..... Id.
' The fifth amendment provides: "nor shall private property be taken for public
use, without just compensation." U.S. CONST. amend. V.
14 684 F.2d at 1310. Neither party raised the fifth amendment "taking" issue. The
question was raised by the court sua sponte. The Bali court explained that claims for
compensation are "property" within the meaning of the fifth amendment. Id. at 1310,
1312.
-- 453 U.S. 654 (1981).
146 Id.
147 Id. at 689-90.
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the Convention limitation, once applied, constitutes a taking
of the plaintiffs' claims, and if so, to enforce the plaintiffs'
right to full compensation.'1' Although the Ninth Circuit did
not strike down the Convention in Bali, its decision may pos-
sibly have far-reaching effects. If the court's Tucker Act anal-
ysis proves to be correct, the United States will be placed in
the position of reimbursing Convention plaintiffs for damages
left uncompensated because of the treaty's liability limitation.
In addition, the tone and legal analysis14' of the Bali decision
may encourage action by the lower courts, which have evaded
the issue of the Convention's constitutionality while awaiting
guidance from the appellate courts. If the Tucker Act analysis
fails, some court, perhaps the Ninth Circuit, may employ the
reasoning in Bali to invalidate the Convention limitations on
due process or equal protection grounds.
III. JUDICIAL ENFORCEMENT OF TICKETING
REQUIREMENTS
The hostility of American courts towards the Warsaw Con-
vention's limitation on liability has been demonstrated by
their rigid enforcement of the Convention's delivery and no-
tice requirements for airline tickets.1 50 Article 3 of the Con-
vention requires that the carrier deliver a ticket to the passen-
ger, and that the ticket contain a statement notifying the
passenger that any loss arising from the transportation is sub-
ject to the Convention's liability limitation.51 Furthermore,
140 684 F.2d at 1313.
"' The part of the Bali opinion which preceeds the Tucker Act analysis is remark-
ably similar to Burdell, which expressed the view that the Warsaw Convention is
unconstitutional. Compare Bali, 684 F.2d at 1308-1310, with Burdell, 10 Av. Cas. at
18,156-61.
0 See Comment, supra note 5 at 142.
'6' Article 3(1) provides:
For the transportation of passengers the carrier must deliver a passen-
ger ticket which shall contain the following particulars:
(a) The place and date of issue;
(b) The place of departure and of destination;
(c) The agreed stopping places, provided that the carrier may
reserve the right to alter the stopping places in case of necessity,
and that if he excercises that right, the alteration shall not have
the effect of depriving the transportation of its international
COMMENTS
Article 3 also provides that failure to deliver a passenger tick-
et precludes the air carrier from utilizing the limitation on
liability."'
In the early days of the Convention, in cases such as Ross v.
Pan American Airways, 153 the Convention's limitation on re-
coveries was applied in spite of circumstances which involved
extremely tenuous compliance with delivery and notice re-
quirements. 154 In Ross, Jane Froman, a well-known enter-
tainer, was severely injured in a plane crash while on a U.S.O.
trip to Europe to entertain American servicemen." 55 Froman
never received possession of the ticket, nor was she aware of
the Warsaw Convention's liability limitation."51 Instead, an
employee of the U.S.O. tour made all transportation arrange-
ments and handled her ticket."' The court found that Fro-
man had seen the ticket on a table, and thereafter by board-
ing the plane she impliedly consented to the ticket's contract
of carriage, including the Warsaw Convention's liability
limitation."58
By the 1960's many courts had impliedly rejected the Ross
approach with regard to delivery and notice."59 In Mertens v.
character;
(d) The name and address of the carrier or carriers;
(e) A statement that the transportation is subject to the rules
relating to liability established by this convention.
Warsaw Convention, supra note 1, art. 3(1).
181 Article 3(2) provides:
The absence, irregularity, or loss of the passenger ticket shall not ef-
fect the existence or the validity of the contract of transportation,
which shall none the less be subject to the rules of this convention.
Nevertheless, if the carrier accepts a passenger without a passenger
ticket having been delivered he shall not be entitled to avail himself of
those provisions of this convention which exclude or limit his liability.
Warsaw Convention, supra note 1, art. 3(2).
"5s 299 N.Y. 88, 85 N.E.2d 880 (1949).
1&4 Whitehead, Still Another View of the Warsaw Convention, 33 J. AIR L. & Com.
651 (1967) (discussing development of judicial hostility to the Warsaw Convention).
155 85 N.E.2d at 883.
1GS Id.
Is d.
"u Id. at 884.
log See, e.g., Mertens v. Flying Tiger Line, 341 F.2d 851 (2d Cir. 1965); Warren v.
Flying Tiger Line, 352 F.2d 494 (9th Cir. 1965); Seth v. BOAC, 329 F.2d 302 (1st Cir.
1964).
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Flying Tiger Line,'60 a delivery case, a plane chartered by the
United States to transport military personnel crashed in Ja-
pan, killing the plaintiffs' decedent.' 6' The plaintiffs argued
that the passenger ticket had never been delivered to the de-
cedent; therefore, the case was not subject to the Convention's
liability limitation."6 2 On appeal, the Second Circuit agreed,
holding that delivery to the decedent after boarding the plane,
moments before take off, and after loading of the material
which the decedent was under military orders to accompany,
was insufficient delivery as a matter of law.' 63 The court for-
mulated the rule that delivery must be adequate to allow a
passenger an opportunity to take protective measures to avoid
the Convention's limitation of liability."'
In the same year as Mertens, the Ninth Circuit reached a
similar conclusion regarding ticket delivery in Warren v. Fly-
ing Tiger Line.16 5 Warren involved the disappearance of a
flight chartered by the United States en route to Vietnam.'"
The Warren court concluded that delivery of tickets to the
pasengers as they boarded the plane did not allow them suffi-
cient opportunity to buy insurance or otherwise protect them-
selves, and therefore the delivery was inadequate to satisfy
the Convention requirement.'17 In addition to the timing of
delivery, both the Warren court and the Mertens court noted
that the small print on the passenger tickets was both un-
noticeable and unreadable."'
The Second Circuit in Lisi v. Alitalia-Linee Aeree Italiane,
S.P.A.' 69 went even further than Mertens17 0 and Warren'7 ' by
60 341 F.2d 851 (2d Cir. 1965).
103 Id. at 853.
162 Id. at 856.
103 Id, at 857.
', Id. at 856. The court stated that "[s]uch self-protective measures could consist
of, for example, deciding not to take the flight, entering a special contract with the
carrier, or taking out additional insurance for the flight." Id. at 856-57.
160 352 F.2d 494 (9th Cir. 1965).
166 Id. at 495.
167 Id, at 498.
" Id. at 497; 341 F.2d at 857.
6- 370 F.2d 508 (2d Cir. 1966).
70 341 F.2d 851 (2d Cir. 1965).
'7 352 F.2d 494 (9th Cir. 1965).
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requiring notice rather than mere physical delivery to passen-
gers. 17 2 In Lisi, which arose out of the crash of one of the de-
fendant's planes in Ireland, 17 the plaintiffs' decedents had re-
ceived physical delivery of their tickets from 3 to 36 days
before departure.' 4 Although a literal reading of Article 3(2)
of the Convention1 7 5 requires only that "delivery" be made,
the Lisi court held that delivery must include adequate notice
of the liability limitation. 17  After examining the extremely
small print documenting the conditions of contract on page
four of the ticket booklet, the Lisi court concluded that the
decedents had not received sufficient notice, and therefore
their recovery of damages would not be limited by the War-
saw Convention. 17
The reasoning in Lisi was subsequently embraced and ap-
plied by other American courts to prevent airlines from as-
serting the Warsaw Convention liability limitation.1 7 8 The
Montreal Agreement 179 of 1967, however, has established uni-
form ticket standards which comply with the notice require-
ment of Lisi,180 thus eliminating much of the litigation based
on ticket "readability. '" 1'8 Nonetheless, plaintiffs have contin-
ued to escape the Warsaw Convention's liability limitations in
cases where passenger tickets violate the requirements of the
,72 370 F.2d at 513.
178 Id. at 510.
'4 Id. at 515.
178 See supra note 152.
178 370 F.2d at 513. The court stated that the ratio decidendi of the Mertens and
Warren cases, which held that delivery must be made in such a manner as to allow
passengers to protect themselves, requires that delivery give actual notice to passen-
gers. Id.
177 Id. at 514.
'78 See, e.g., Bayless v. S.A. Empresa de Viacao Aerea Rio Grandense, 10 Av.Cas.
17,881 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) (tickets virtually identical to those in Lisi held inadequate);
Egen v. Kollsman Instrument Corp., 21 N.Y. 2d 160, 234 N.E.2d 199, 387 N.Y.S.2d 14
(1967) (unreadable notice on ticket not adequate under the Warsaw Convention); Eck
v. United Arab Airlines, 15 N.Y.2d 53, 203 N.E.2d 640, 255 N.Y.S.2d (1964)(notice on
ticket similar to ticket in Lisi held insufficient).
170 See supra note 53.
'50 The Montreal Agreement, supra note 53, provides that notice be given: (1) in 10
point modern type; (2) in contrasting color; (3) on each ticket, each piece of paper
attached to the ticket, or on the ticket envelope.
* ' See Loggans, supra note 4, at 557.
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Montreal Agreement" 2 or where physical delivery of the tick-
et is faulty.' It thus appears that the courts will continue to
use the delivery and notice requirements whenever possible to
avoid application of the Warsaw Convention's low ceiling on
airline liability.
IV. INADEQUACY OF THE POINCARE GOLD FRANC
AS THE WARSAW CONVENTION'S UNIT OF
CONVERSION
The most devastating action ever taken by a court against
the Warsaw Convention occurred in 1982 in Franklin Mint
Corp. v. Trans World Airlines.8 " Franklin Mint involved a
suit for the loss or destruction of the plaintiff's cargo on an
international flight from the United States to England. 85 The
plaintiff's claim was subject to the Convention's limitation on
liability for loss of cargo."' The Second Circuit held that "the
Convention's limits on liability for loss of cargo are unenforce-
able in United States courts.' 87 The reason for the court's
holding was that the Convention's liability limitations,188
which employ gold as a unit of conversion, no longer specify a
method for the courts to translate judgments into domestic
currency.189
The difficulty that the Franklin Mint court recognized in
'61 See In re Air Crash Disaster at Warsaw, Poland, on March 14, 1980, 535 F.
Supp. 833 (E.D.N.Y. 1982) (use by airline of 8.5 point rather than 10 point type in
advising passengers of applicable, limitation of liability constituted material breach of
Montreal Agreement, and therefore limitation of liability was inapplicable).
I See Manion v. Pan American World Airways, 55 N.Y.2d 398, 434 N.E.2d 1060,
449 N.Y.S.2d 693 (1982) (failure of airline to deliver ticket containing notice of War-
saw Convention liability limitation until second leg of international trip would pre-
vent airline from invoking liability ceiling of the Convention).
690 F.2d 303 (2d Cir. 1982) cert. granted, 51 U.S.L.W. 3883 (U.S. June 13, 1983)
(No. 82-1186).
'' Id. at 304.
'"Id.
'' Id. at 311. The ruling was made prospective and applies only to "events creating
liability occurring 60 days from the issuance of the mandate in this case." Id.
SI See supra note 15. The Warsaw Convention's liability limitation for checked
baggage and other cargo is fixed at 250 gold francs per kilogram, unless the parties
make separate arrangements for increased liability. Warsaw Convention, supra note
1, art. 22(2).
61, 690 F.2d at 311.
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applying the Warsaw Convention's limitations arises from the
fact that gold no longer has an official monetary function."'0
When the Convention was drafted, gold was chosen as the
unit of conversion because of its uniform, stable, and easily
calculable value, which was due to its international monetary
function and legally established price.1 91 The court noted that
until 1978, when gold lost its official monetary function, the
courts had no difficulty in applying the Convention's liability
limitations in a consistent and regular fashion. 92 In contrast,
since 1978, the courts have been forced to choose among alter-
native units of conversion in order to enforce the limitations
on recoveries.193
In Franklin Mint, the parties asked the court to choose
among four alternatives: (1) the last official price of gold in
the United States; (2) the free market price of gold; (3) the
International Monetary Fund's "SDR"; 94 and (4) the ex-
change value of the current French franc.1 98 The court re-
frained from selecting a new unit of conversion, however, and
held that such a decision constitutes a nonjudicial, political
question, which may not be resolved by the courts. 96 Accord-
ingly, the court held that until a new unit of conversion is
selected "either through treaty approval by the Senate or by
legislation passing both Houses of the Congress ... the Con-
vention's limits on liability for loss of cargo are unenforceable
in United States courts.1 97 Although the ruling in Franklin
I" Id. at 305. This problem was foreseen by Allan I. Mendelsohn, one of the fore-
most authorities on matters relating to the Warsaw Convention. See Mendelsohn,
The Value of the Poincare Gold Franc in Limitation of Liability Conventions, 5 J.
MAR. L. & COM. 125 (1973).
'o' 690 F.2d at 305.
'" Id. at 307.
193 Id. at 308-09. See In re Air Crash Disaster at Warsaw, Poland, on March 14,
1980, 535 F. Supp. 833 (E.D.N.Y. 1982)(choosing the last official price of gold as the
method of conversion); Boehringer Mannheim Diagnostics, Inc. v. Pan American
World Airways, 531 F. Supp. 344 (S.D. Tex. 1981) (adopting the free market price of
gold to convert Warsaw Convention judgments). In addition, various foreign courts
have opted to use the current French franc and the SDR, a unit of account estab-
lished by the International Monetary Fund. 690 F.2d at 308-09.
' See supra note 71.
690 F.2d at 305.
'" Id. at 311.
197 Id.
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Mint was directed towards the liability ceiling on recoveries
for loss of cargo, the same rationale should apply to cases in-
volving limitations on death or personal injury recoveries aris-
ing from international air travel, because the latter limitation
is also expressed in terms of gold Poincare francs.1 98 In 1983,
this logical extension of the Franklin Mint holding was ap-
plied by a federal district court in California, in In re Air-
crash at Kimpo International Airport, Korea on November
18, 1980.11" If Franklin Mint is controlling, for the first time
in fifty years airlines may be forced to pay full compensation
to passengers injured or killed on international flights.
V. CONCLUSION
The Warsaw Convention's limitation on airline liability has
outlived its usefulness now that the airline industry has out-
grown its infancy to establish itself as a powerful, safe, easily
insurable, and stable enterprise.2 0 0 There is no longer any
need to provide special protection to an industry which is ca-
pable of reimbursing customers for the damages it causes
them. The Convention's liability limitations, unaccompanied
by any meaningful quid pro quo to benefit passengers, is an
affront to the American ideal of full and adequate compensa-
tion to injured plaintiffs by those responsible for the harm.2 01
The executive and legislative branches have repeatedly ex-
pressed disapproval of the injustices caused by the present
Warsaw system. Nonetheless, the Warsaw Convention has re-
mained intact for fifty years, virtually untouched by either
branch.0 2 It has been the task of the judiciary to enforce this
outdated and inequitable Convention against injured passen-
198 See supra note 15. Although the currently enforceable Montreal Agreement is
expressed in terms of United States dollars, it is not an amendment to the Warsaw
Convention, but instead constitutes a "waiver" of the Warsaw Convention's limita-
tion up to $75,000. Thus, if the original Warsaw Convention is unenforceable, the
airlines cannot claim a limited waiver of a defense which they are not otherwise al-
lowed to assert.
1 558 F. Supp. 72 (C.D. Cal. 1983).
:00 See Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra note 9, at 504.
201 See generally Kreindler, supra note 3, at 529-31.
101 See supra notes 9-74 and accompanying text.
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gers, most of whom were never aware that such a treaty even
existed.2 08
It is not surprising that the courts have become hostile to
the Warsaw Convention, and have circumvented the liability
limitations whenever possible. In 1982, for example, there
were at least four reported cases in which courts interpreted
and applied the Convention to benefit plaintiffs restricted by
the treaty provisions.0 4 Two of those cases may prove to have
a devastating effect on the Convention's liability limitations.
The Bali205 court's constitutional analysis of the Convention
has laid the groundwork for a ruling that the liability limita-
tions constitute: (1) a "taking" which requires just compensa-
tion under the fifth amendment;20 6 or (2) a violation of the
equal protection 0 7 and due process"" guarantees of the fifth
amendment. Bali marks the first time that an appellate court
has acknowledged the serious possibility that the Convention
is in violation of the United States Constitution.0 9
In Franklin Mint,2" the Second Circuit ruled that the Con-
vention's limitation on damages for loss of cargo is prospec-
tively unenforceable in United States courts .2 1 This holding
would logically apply to the liability limitations on wrongful
death and personal injury suits as well, because the rationale
was based upon the inadequacy of the Convention's use of the
gold franc as its unit of conversion for translating judgments
into domestic currency. Absent any action by the executive or
legislative branches, it appears that the judiciary may be in
the final stages of dismantling the liability limitations of the
o See, e.g., supra note 153 and accompanying text.
See In re Aircrash in Bali, Indonesia, discussed supra at notes 121-44 and ac-
companying text; In re Air Crash Disaster at Warsaw, Poland, discussed supra note
182; Manion v. Pan American Airways, discussed supra note 183; Franklin Mint
Corp. v. Trans World Airlines, discussed supra notes 184-97 and accompanying text.
o See supra notes 121-144 and accompanying text.
' See supra note 143 and accompanying text.
207 See supra note 103 and accompanying text.
208 See supra note 88 and accompanying text.
" Cf. Burdell v. Canadian Pacific Airlines, 10 Av. Cas. 18,151 (Ill. Cir. Ct. 1968)
(trial court ruled Warsaw Convention unconstitutional, but later withdrew that por-
tion of its opinion).
0'0 690 F.2d 303 (2d Cir. 1982).
"2 Id. at 311.
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Warsaw Convention.
It is unclear whether the courts' actions with regard to the
Convention are appropriate conduct for the judiciary. The Su-
preme Court has consistently indicated that the treaty-mak-
ing power should be given great deference by the courts. In
spite of widespread criticism of the Convention, it is the duty
of the courts to apply the laws of the United States, unless
there are compelling reasons for not enforcing them. Thus, it
may be argued that the Bali and Franklin Mint courts have
disregarded their judicial function and have invaded the juris-
diction of the executive and legislative branches by attempt-
ing to change the terms of the Convention.
The Convention is adhered to throughout the world and has
brought a degree of order and cooperation to international air
commerce. Thus, criticism may be directed at the courts for
tampering with the complexities of international rela-
tions-complexities which are beyond the competence of judi-
cial resolution. Any modification of American participation in
the Convention is arguably a matter exclusively for executive
or legislative action, and the courts should not second guess
the wisdom of these two branches.
In defense of judicial activism towards the Convention, the
equitable function of the courts is an important consideration.
American tort law is designed to provide full and adequate
compensation to injured plaintiffs by imposing the cost of
damages on the responsible parties. The courts strive to ad-
minister this compensatory system, but they are frustrated in
those cases in which the Convention imposes its low ceiling on
liability. In order to enforce the Convention the courts are re-
quired to deny full compensation to injured plaintiffs for any
damages which exceed the Convention limits. Thus, the air-
lines receive a windfall at the expense of injured travelers who
are generally unaware that their legal rights have been limited
by international treaty.
As a general rule, American tort law does not shield
healthy, insurable industries from the duty to compensate
persons injured in the course of business. The development of
strict products liability and other doctrines shows a judicial
COMMENTS
concern for protecting individuals at the expense of industry.
The Convention, on the other hand, sacrifices the needs of in-
jured passengers in order to lower the operating costs of air-
lines. This protection of air carriers is unacceptable because of
the commercial air industry's excellent safety record, which
would make full liability insurance a miniscule portion of op-
erating costs. Unfortunately, the American political process is
inadequate for changing the Warsaw system. International air
travelers, whose interests are affected only upon the rare oc-
currence of an aircrash, and the general American populace,
which is unaware of the Convention's existence, do not com-
pose a cohesive lobbying force in Congress.
Although the courts are not empowered to redraft the Con-
vention as they see fit, they should not be faulted for their
reluctance to enforce the treaty at the expense of fairness and
justice. If the judiciary blindly enforces unjust and inequitable
laws, it does so at the expense of its persuasive force upon
which it relies for its influence in the governmental system.
Therefore, the courts have a duty to use the tools of statutory
construction, constitutional review and judicial restraint to
nullify the impact of laws which violate fundamental princi-
ples of equity, and cause significant harm to the public. Deci-
sions such as Bali and Franklin Mint may instigate executive
or legislative action to finally correct the Convention's
shortcomings.
The Supreme Court has been conspicuously withdrawn
from the controversy surrounding the Treaty, and may per-
haps continue its historical refusal to rule on the validity of
the Convention. The need, however, for an authoritative rul-
ing by the Court is urgent, and should not be ignored. It is no
longer clear that the Convention's liability provisions will be
enforced in American courts. This uncertainty will obstruct
the expectations of litigants and weaken United States partic-
ipation in the regulation of international air commerce.
The Court has granted certiorari in the Franklin Mint case
212 and the outcome of that dispute will certainly be influ-
2S 51 U.S.L.W. 3883 (U.S. June 13, 1983) (No. 82-1186).
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enced by its long-standing policy of upholding duly-enacted
treaties. In Franklin Mint, the Court might agree with the
Second Circuit that the Convention's limitation on liability is
judicially unenforceable without corrective legislative action,
because the Court's policy towards treaties has been based on
such deference to legislative and executive decision making.
This rationale could, therefore, provide a means for the Court
to lay the Warsaw Convention to rest in the name of judicial
deference rather than judicial activism.
The Warsaw Convention as it now exists, is facing a very
uncertain future. Supreme Court action is urgently needed to
settle the question of the Convention's continuing validity,
and to resolve the conflicting decisions of various federal
courts. The Senate has continued its fifty-year history of irre-
sponsibility toward the issues surrounding the Convention,
and the President has announced no plans to withdraw the
United States from the treaty. Thus, the Supreme Court must
overcome its institutional reluctance to deal with matters of
international relations, and provide guidance to lower courts
which have been struggling for half a century to administer
justice under uncertain laws.
